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"Human Rights, Responsibilities,
and Democracy," Sikkink
Comments on Tasioulas and Moyn
Papers: "Symposium on the
Future of International Human
Rights Law"
Kathryn Sikkink*
ABSTRACT

It is a pleasureand a challenge to comment on these two very
different Articles, "Saving Human Rights from Human Rights
Law," by John Tasioulas, and 'On Human Rights and Majority
Politics: Felix Frankfurter's Democratic Theory," by Samuel
Moyn.1 Both are rich, complex, and thought-provoking. To the
degree they share any common dimension, it would be their
skepticism toward human rights law, and in particulartoward
the judicializationof human rights law. But the skepticism comes
from quite different directions and from their different
disciplines. In the case of Tasioulas's paper, the skepticism
derives from his belief that legal human rights have gone beyond
the realm of moral human rights, and thus he critiques
unjustified legalization and judicialization of human rights.
Moyn focuses on US constitutional law to argue that courts
should exercise more deference with regard to the laws and
policies decided upon by democratic majorities. In Tasioulas's
case, human rights law is contrasted with morality and found
wanting, and in Moyn's case, human rights law is contrasted
with democracy and found wanting.

* Thanks to Joshua Minchin, Ben Colallilo, and the other editors of the Vanderbilt
Journal of TransnationalLaw for the invitation and editing. I also want to thank the
other presenters at the Nashville symposium for their comments and suggestions,
including Karima Bennoune, James Gathii, Lorna McGregor, Gopal Sreenivasan, John
Tasioulas, and Samuel Moyn.
John Tasioulas, Saving Human Rights from Human Rights Law, 52 VAND. J.
1.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1167, 1173 (2019); Samuel Moyn, Human Rights and Majority Politics,
52 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1135, 1137-40 (2019) [hereinafter Moyn, Majority Politics].
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The approach of this Article is different: unlike Tasioulas and
Moyn's Articles, this Article is not skeptical about human rights law.
The 2017 book, Evidence for Hope: Making Human Rights Work in the
21st Century, offered an evidence-based evaluation and defense of the
legitimacy and effectiveness of international human rights law,
institutions, and movements. 2 The book confronted a series of critiques
that were unsubstantiated historically and empirically, including some
3
arguments in the earlier work of Samuel Moyn. But the content of
that book will not be rehearsed here. These particular Articles offer a
more nuanced and interesting critique of human rights law that in a
few ways coincide with some of this author's own concerns and
recommendations, as elaborated in this author's forthcoming book, The
4
Hidden Face of Rights: Towards an Ethic of Responsibility.

I. MORALITY VS. LAW?

Tasioulas wants to "sav[e] human rights from the way in which
they have been distorted by human rights law that has transgressed
its proper bounds." 5 In particular, he wants to save law by "bringing it
into greater alignment with . . . human rights morality." 6 For
Tasioulas, the role of human rights law is to "give effect to universal
moral rights."7 He argues that people have an intuitive sense of moral

2.

See generally KATHRYN SIKKINK,

EVIDENCE FOR HOPE: MAKING HUMAN

RIGHTS WORK IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Princeton Univ. Press 2017) (defending the efficacy
of human rights law and institutions using empirical research and fieldwork from
throughout the 20th Century).
Compare id. at 20-38, 126-29, 196-200, 235-42 (defending the expansion of
3.
human rights law and institutions), with SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN
RIGHTS IN HISTORY 220 (Harv. Univ. Press 2010) (arguing that the expansion of human
rights law has changed fundamental issues of inequality) [hereinafter MOYN, THE LAST
UTOPIA], and SAMUEL MOYN, NOT ENOUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD

(Harv. Univ. Press 2018) (reiterating the argument that the expansion of human rights
law is related to inequality) [hereinafter MoYN, NOT ENOUGH].
4.

See generally KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE HIDDEN FACE OF RIGHTS: TOWARDS A

POLITICS OF RESPONSIBILITIES (forthcoming Jan. 2020); accord Fernando Berdion Del
Valle & Kathryn Sikkink, (Re)DiscoveringDuties: Individual Responsibilities in the Age
of Rights, 26 MINN. J. INT'L L. 189, 189 (2017).
Tasioulas, supra note 1, at 1173.
5.
Id.
6.
Id. at 1175.
7.

2019]

HUMAN RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITY, AND DEMOCRACY

1317

rights, and that these rights should not be confused with interests and
values. 8 One way to distinguish moral rights from such interests and
values that Tasioulas stresses here is that moral rights are associated
with obligations-not just obligations of states but obligations for all.9
These obligations are categorial: they cannot be ignored or denied or
traded off.' 0 But in Tasioulas's view, human rights law has strayed
beyond the range of these rights involving obligations, and this in turn
leads to human rights inflation."
Not all good things in the world should be called human rights,
and not all human rights should be judicialized. There are some
important universal moral underpinnings to current international
human rights law that should not be ignored. One of the main
arguments in Evidence for Hope was that the origins of international
human rights law were far more diverse than is often understood,
deriving not only from the Global North, but importantly as well from
countries and movements in the Global South. 12 Such diverse and
widespread origins and support for international human rights law
point to a deeper moral basis for the law shared by many cultures.
The comments here, however, will mainly address Tasioulas's
belief that not all good things in the world should be turned into human
rights law.1 3 This author, in a forthcoming book, has made a related
argument with regard to some issues, such as the environment. 14
Some progressive writers and activists are so focused on rights that
they bend over backwards to frame all environmental issues as rights
claims. For example, environmental activists have increasingly started
to speak in terms of rights: the right to a clean environment, the rights
of trees, the rights of rivers, or the rights of Mother Earth herself, as
reflected in the Pachamama laws of Bolivia and Ecuador. 15 An
environmental group has brought a lawsuit to give the Colorado River

8.
See id. at 1178-80.
9.
See id. at 1179-80.
10.
See id. at 1180.
11.
See id. at 1181.
See SIKKINK, supra note 2, at 55-139 (documenting the many contributions
12.
that countries in the Global South made to the developments of international human
rights law); see also STEPHEN JENSEN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:
THE 1960s, DECOLONIZATION, AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL VALUES 1

(Cambridge Univ. Press 2016).
13.
See Tasioulas, supranote 1, at 1173-74.
14.
See SIKKINK, supra note 4, at 53-66; accord Del Valle & Sikkink, supra note
4, at 243-45.
15.
See, e.g., Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-TowardLegal
Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 453-55 (1972); see also Cletus Gregor
Barie, Nuevas Narrativas Constitucionales en Bolivia y Ecuador: El Buen Vivir y Los
Derechos de La Naturaleza, 59 LATINOAMtRICA: REV. DE ESTUDIOS LATINOAMERICANOS

9, 9-40 (2014).
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legal rights. 16 If it succeeds, that river will join a small handful of
others, such as the Ganges, that have legal rights. 1 7 There is nothing
wrong with the idea of rivers, trees, or even Mother Earth having
rights, but it is even more important to stress the responsibilities of
countries, corporations, states and municipalities, organizations, and
individuals to protect them.
Climate change is one of the most pressing issues of our age, but
it is not an issue where the framing in terms of human rights is
particularly helpful.1 8 Instead, it should be framed primarily in terms
of forward-looking responsibilities of the kind discussed by Iris Marion
Young in her book Responsibilityfor Justice.1 9 The most common legal
20
But
meaning of responsibility focuses on who is accountable or liable.
both the ordinary language meaning of responsibility and the
philosophical discussion of responsibility are far richer and more
nuanced than the legal model, what Iris Young called "backwardlooking responsibility" or the "liability model of responsibility." 21
Forward-looking responsibilities are held by states and corporations as
well as by nonstate institutions and by individuals, who are not
necessarily liable or to blame for a common human rights problem but
can nevertheless help address it.22 This type of responsibility asks not

16.
Marianne Goodland, Lawsuit: Give the Colorado River the Same Rights as
2017),
26,
(Sept.
GAzETTE
SPRINGS
COLO.
Corporations,
People,
https://gazette.com/news/lawsuit-give-the-colorado-river-the-sames-rights-as[https://perma.cc/5QGCpeople/article427a9lf7-608e-5dc3-a7be-laf357bb2a2d.html
ZMQJ] (archived Sept. 1, 2019).
17.
See Michael Safi, Ganges and Yamuna Rivers GrantedSame Legal Rights as
Human Beings, GUARDIAN, Mar. 21, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/
mar/21/ganges-and-yamuna-rivers-granted-same-legal-rights-as-human-beings
[https://perma.cc/6HBQ-YJQL] (archived Sept. 1, 2019) (noting a recent New Zealand
court decision giving rights to two sacred rivers of the Maori people); see also Eleanor
Ainge Roy, New Zealand River Granted Same Legal Rights as Human Being, GUARDIAN,
Mar. 16, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/16/new-zealand-river(archived
[https://perma.cclPA6W-28MT]
granted-same-legal-rights-as-human-being
Sept. 1, 2019) (granting the same legal status as a person to a river) (the author thanks
her brother-in-law, Richard Johnson, for calling this issue to her attention).
See, e.g., Human Rights and Climate Change, U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH
18.
COMM'R OF HUMAN RIGHTS, https://www.ohchr.org/enlissues/hrandclimatechange/pages/
hrclimatechangeindex.aspx (last visited Sept. 1, 2019) [https://perma.cc/6LU3-SVND]
(archived Sept. 1, 2019) (noting that climate change issues can indirectly affect human
rights).
19.

See IRIS M. YOUNG, RESPONSIBILITY FOR JUSTICE xv (Oxford Univ. Press

2011) (describing responsibility as a forward-looking concept).
See id. at 158 (noting that legal meaning of responsibility is usually restricted
20.
to a liability model).
See id. at 98 (defining "liability model of responsibility" as practices such as
21.
assigning responsibility under the law and in moral judgment that seek to identify liable
parties for sanctioning or redress, and noting these practices are all "backward-looking").
See id. at 109 (corporations may not be directly responsible for human rights
22.
problems but may be in a position to help solve them).
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"who is to blame [?]" but "what should we do?" 23 It is aimed at
accomplishing things effectively rather than punishing those who are
at fault. 24 The forward-looking responsibilities discussed in The
Hidden Face of Rights are not limited to those for climate change but
are also necessary to promote a broad range of civil, political, economic,
and social rights. 25 Climate change is a particularly clear and
instructive example of an issue where a model focused only on rights
and backward-looking responsibility is simply inadequate. 26
The liability model is not helpful, in part because it is too late to
only focus on who is to blame for climate change. Rather, we need to
ask all groups socially connected to the problem of climate change and
able to act to step up and do their share. Everyone connected to the
structural injustice of climate change needs to exercise collective
responsibilities. 27 In order to fulfill and enjoy rights, increased
attention to responsibilities of diverse actors is needed.
In this sense, Tasioulas is correct that it is not sufficient to speak
of legal rights and the corresponding legal liability, but that moral
responsibilities must be considered. 2 8 But it is not necessary to "sav[e]
human rights from human rights law." 29 Rather, human rights law
must be complemented with attention to ethical and political
responsibilities. Existing human rights law is not the problem. But the
implementation of human rights must be improved via reclaiming
responsibility within the framework of both enhanced democracy and
robust rights protections.
Human rights law does not and should not require that all human
rights problems be judicialized. The rise of individual criminal
accountability for a small number of core crimes and mass atrocity is
both morally justifiable and empirically effective. 3 0 But that does not

23.

ONORA O'NEILL, JUSTICE ACROSS BOUNDARIES: WHOSE OBLIGATIONS? 1, 166-

167 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2016).
24.

MARK BLITZ, DUTY BOUND: RESPONSIBILITY AND AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 1

(2005).
25.
See SIKKINK, supra note 4, at 6.
26.
See, e.g., Augustin Fragnidre, Climate Change and Individual Duties, 7
WILEY INTERDISC. REV.: CLIMATE CHANGE 798 (2016) (critically examining human rights
developments through the lens of climate change); see also SIKKINK, supra note 4, at 12.
27.
See YOUNG, supra note 19, at 95 (proposing a "social connection model" of
responsibility).

28.
29.

See Tasioulas, supra note 1, at 1175.
Id.

30.
See KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: How HUMAN RIGHTS
PROSECUTIONS ARE CHANGING WORLD POLITICS 100 (2011) (describing the conceptual

change from holding state accountable to holding individuals accountable); Hunjoon Kim
& Kathryn Sikkink, Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights Prosecutionsfor
Transitional Countries, 54 INT'L STUD. Q., 939, 942 (2010) (describing moving from
holding state accountable to holding individuals accountable); see also Hyeran Jo & Beth
A. Simmons, Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?, 70 INT'L ORG. 443,
468-70 (2016).
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mean that all human rights should be subject to this kind of
judicialization. Because of this, the discussions of judicialization in
both these papers should have been more specific about the types of
rights and the types of judicialization being discussed.
Moyn also speaks of human rights and judicialization, but he does
not distinguish between the judicialization of constitutional rights, the
main topic of his Article, and the international judicialization of human
rights, nor between state accountability and individual criminal
accountability. 31 These are complex issues, the judicialization of
constitutional rights is quite different from the judicialization of
international human rights. And it is very possible that one form of
judicialization is useful and other forms are less so. The most farreaching judicialization of rights at the international level has been
with regard to core crimes and mass atrocity, via the International
Criminal Court (ICC).32 This is exactly the area where international
judicialization is appropriate and necessary.
Tasioulas follows a line of philosophical reasoning that is more
interested in moral rights and obligations than legal ones. 3 Many
other legal and philosophical writers have stressed the importance of
responsibilities and obligations in debates over human rights.34 Many
philosophers share Tasioulas's understanding of moral rights as rights
that are associated with obligations, not just obligations of states but
of other nonstate actors as well. In his classic 1996 book, Basic Rights,

See NEAL TATE & TORBJORN VALLINDER, The Global Expansion of Judicial
31.
Power: The Judicializationof Politics, in THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER 1,
1-11 (1995) (describing the types of judicialization); SIKEINK, supra note 30, at 14-18
(noting a distinction between state accountability and individual criminal
accountability).
See CARSTEN STAHN, Admissibility Challenges before the ICC: From Quasi32.
Primacy to Qualified Deference?, in THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL COURT 245 (2015) (noting that ICC jurisdiction is usually limited to the most
egregious offenses); STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY

6, 211-12 (2d ed. 2001) (noting that ICC jurisdiction is usually limited to human rights
crimes and mass atrocities).
See Tasioulas, supra note 1, at 1169, 1178 (arguing that human rights law
33.
has strayed from its formative purpose in the Formative Aim These, which gives effect
to the underlying morality of human rights).
34.

See, e.g., WILLIAM F. FELICE, THE ETHICS OF INTERDEPENDENCE: GLOBAL

HUMAN RIGHTS AND DUTIES (2016); Eric R. Boot, Human Duties and the Limits of
Human Rights Discourse, in STUDIES IN GLOBAL JUSTICE 17 (Deen K. Chatterjee ed.,
2017); Makau W. Mutua, The Banjul Charterand the African Cultural Fingerprint:An
Evaluationof the Language of Duties, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 339, 340 (1995); Jeremy Waldron,
Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107, 1107 (2011). See also
STEPHAN PARMENTIER ET AL., BETWEEN RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES: A FUNDAMENTAL

DEBATE (2016); Julio Montero, Human Rights, Personal Responsibility, and Human
Dignity: What Are Our Moral Duties to Promote the Universal Realization of Human
Rights?, 18 HUM. RTS. REV., 67, 70 (2017); Samuel Moyn, Rights us. Duties: Reclaiming
Civic Balance, Bos. REV. (May 16, 2016), http:/fbostonreview.net/books-ideas/samuelmoyn-rights-duties [https://perma.cclE95G-K7HX] (archived Sept. 1, 2019).
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for example, Henry Shue elaborates the various types of moral duties
of all actors that are necessary to contribute to the enjoyment of
rights.35 Charles Beitz speaks of the "demand side" of human rights
and also the "supply side," by which he means "the reasons why some
class of agents should regard themselves as under an obligation to
respect or enforce the human rights of others." 36 He distinguishes
between the "first-level" responsibilities of states with the primary
duty to respect and protect rights and the "second-level"
responsibilities of other agents, who may need to act when
governments cannot or will not perform their responsibility. 3 Mathias
Risse understands human rights as "rights that are accompanied by
responsibilities at the global level," but he recognizes that duties across
borders are "notoriously underspecified." 3 He argues, borrowing
Beitz's categories, that his own approach to human rights is supplyside focused, making global responsibilities central.3 9 Thomas Pogge
has drawn attention to the duties of individuals, arguing that citizens
of wealthy countries are implicated in global injustice through their
active or passive support of oppressive political regimes. 40 Pogge
recognizes that citizens of industrialized nations have negative dutiesnot to impose unjust systems on the world's poor. 4 1

Despite the arguments offered by philosophers like Tasioulas,
however, both the law and the practical politics of rights continue to be
demand-side focused; to the degree that they look at the supply side,
they have focused almost entirely on state duties. 42 It is not enough to
provide philosophical justifications; the political and normative
barriers to further discussion of nonstate responsibilities in relation to
rights must be confronted. Two Belgian philosophers, for example, say

35.
See HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY 52-53 (2d ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1996) (arguing that fundamental
rights impose corresponding duties on actors); see also Barbara Frey, A Review of a
ClassicBook: Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. ForeignPolicy,
2 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 189, 189-94 (2017) (stressing Shue's attention to duties and their
relevance to business and human rights issues today).
36.

2011).
37.

CHARLES R. BEITZ, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 59 (Oxford Univ. Press

Id. at 106-09.

38.

MATHIAS RISSE, ON GLOBAL JUSTICE 177, 191 (Princeton Univ. Press 2012).

39.

Id. at 177.

40.

See THOMAS W. POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COSMOPOLITAN

RESPONSIBILITIES AND REFORMS 1, 162 (2d ed., Polity 2008) (2002) (arguing that wealthy
countries often passively support oppressive political regimes that participate in human
rights violations).
41.
See id. at 172.
42.
See Ben Saul, In the Shadow of Human Rights: Human Duties, Obligations,
and Responsibilities, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 565, 567-69 (2001) (noting the decline
of civic responsibility, the feeling of entitlement to government services, and discussion
of what the government should do for its citizens); Boot, supra note 34, at 35 (arguing
that state responsibilities are prioritized over those of the individual).
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that responsibilities are often treated as if they were the "hidden and
43
shameful face" of human rights.
Philosophically, this Article takes a pragmatic or practical
approach to human rights along the lines outlined by Charles Beitzthat is, existing human rights law is a good place to begin for moral
inquiry, because the multiple decisions of many individuals
representing many states around the world seem a better ethical
starting place than to substitute one's own normative criteria. 44
Tasioulas's attempts to distinguish which human rights listed in the
UDHR are not really human rights appear futile, but his call for more
scrutiny or skepticism with regard to efforts under way to formulate or
45
draft new rights is well taken.
Although it is possible that not all good things are rights and that
human rights need to be accompanied by ethical and political
obligations, it is concerning that Tasioulas's work here might be
classed together with other authors who embrace responsibilities
mainly to challenge rights, arguing that rights should be subject to
46
Tasioulas
limits and that these limits are defined by responsibilities.
is not the first to claim that "rights talk" sometimes stimulates the
proliferation of questionable "rights," such as the right to peace or
international solidarity. 47 States sometimes deny rights to individuals
on the basis of their failure to perform certain duties. This Article
rejects the idea that rights and obligations should exist in some kind
of legal conditional relationship that allows rights to be taken away if
one does not comply with some responsibility. Humans have rights by
virtue of being human, and they are not conditional on the performance
of duties.

43.

Francois Ost & Sebastien van Drooghenbroeck, La Responsibilidad Como

Cara Oculta de los Derechos Humanos, 5 ANUARIO DE DERECHOS HuMANos, NUEVA

tPOCA 785, 796 (2004).
44. See BEITZ, supra note 36, at xii (arguing that states' existing human rights
law contains less inherent biases than normative judgements about rights).
See Tasioulas, supra note 1, at 1176 (arguing that some rights enumerated in
45.
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are not human rights at all).
See, e.g., Boot, supra note 34 (arguing that human rights should be limited to
46.
state responsibilities).
Tasioulas, supra note 1, at 1206 (arguing that overarching normative
47.
discussions of human rights law conflates rights with interests); see also MARY ANN
GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITIcAL DiscoURSE 14 (Free Press

1991) (noting that "rights talk" can lead to disparaging notions of freedom); Jacob
Mchangama & Gughelmo Verdirame, The Danger of Human Rights Proliferation,
FOREIGN AFF. (July 24, 2013), https://www.foreignaffairs.comlarticles/europe/2013-0724/danger-human-rights-proliferation [https://perma.cc/S3Y8-KHP7] (archived Sept. 30,
2017) (states can hide behind the use of human rights law to attack some rights); Boot,
supra note 34, at 177 (arguing that rights discussions uncoupled from duties stimulate
perverse notions of freedom).
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II. RIGHTS VS. DEMOCRACY?
Moyn's Article makes a series of very different arguments than
Tasioulas's Article. Human rights are again questioned, but this time
in relation to democracy and the demands of majorities in democratic
countries.4 8 Moyn raises a plausible and engaging debate at the heart
of rights, and is to be commended for drawing our attention to this
issue, and to the interesting illustrations from Roosevelt and Justice
Frankfurter. 49
First, Moyn's use of the term "human rights" throughout his
Article was surprising.5 0 After expending considerable ink in his book
The Last Utopia to convince readers that human rights emerged in the
1970s, and not in the 1930s, in his Article Moyn makes an almost
casual use of the term human rights in the context of US constitutional
law in the 1930s. 5 1 Does this signal that he no longer believes that
human rights began in the 1970s? If so, a brief recognition of the
difference between his treatment of the term here and in The Last
Utopia would be welcome. 52 Or is it simply useful now to use human
rights in the context of the 1930s, to support the argument that human
rights are used to shield "elite power from popular incursion"? 53 But in
the United States during this period, the term human rights was not
being used with any regularity. 54 Moyn is talking about US
constitutional rights here, not human rights, and that should be taken
into account by the reader.5 5 Tasioulas, for example, clearly stresses
the difference between human rights and constitutional rights, or what

48.
See Tasioulas, supra note 1, at 1201-02 (arguing previous notions that rights
protect minorities from majorities may be misguided).
49.
See Moyn, Majority Politics, supra note 1, at 1136-38 (examining the
reconciliation of human rights with majority politics through US President Roosevelt
and Justice Frankfurter).
50.
See, e.g., id. (describing human rights throughout).
51.
See MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA, supra note 3, at 50 (noting that the modern
concept of human rights emerged in the postcolonial period in the 1970s); Moyn, Majority
Politics, supra note 1, at 1136 (arguing in Roosevelt's speech in honor of the Constitution
in September 1937 hardly rejected human rights).
52.
Contra MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA, supra note 3. See, e.g., Steven L.B. Jensen,
The Making of International Human Rights: The 1960s, Decolonization, and the
Reconstruction of Global Values, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (Stefan-Ludwig
Hoffmann & Samuel Moyn eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2016) (defending the idea that
the international protection of human rights emerged in the 1940s and was given a boost
after decolonization in the 1960s); SIKKINK, supra note 2, at 22-55 (noting that contrary
to Moyn's assertion, human rights may have started in the 1940s).
53.
Moyn, Majority Politics, supra note 1, at 1136.
54.
This is supported by the Google Ngram of the words "human rights," using
the Google Books Ngram viewer, which shows the use of the term almost flat in the
1930s. See https://books.google.com/ngrams#
(last visited Sept.
20, 2019)
[https://perma.cclYSL6-P54S] (archived Sept. 20, 2019).
55.
See Moyn, Majority Politics, supra note 1.
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he calls rights people have by virtue of their membership in particular
6
communities or citizenship rights.5
If Moyn is making an argument in the context of US constitutional
law that he later hopes to apply to human rights judicialization in
democracies in the world, careful use of the term human rights is all
the more important. Modern constitutions in many parts of Latin
America, as well as in other parts of the Global South, including South
Africa and India, were written explicitly to include human rights
language taken from international human rights law. 5 When human
rights litigation around socioeconomic rights in Latin America, India,
or South Africa, for example, is considered, it is indeed relevant to talk
about human rights as embodied both in treaty obligations and
incorporated into constitutional law.5 8
Respect for the decisions of democracy should be an integral part
of any human rights perspective. Empirical research on human rights
has shown that there is a strong correlation between democracy and
high human rights performance. 59 Promoting and respecting
democracy is something that all human rights activists should aspire
to. Human rights law, institutions, and activism have been most
important exactly in those countries that do not have democracies, and
in the best of cases, have contributed toward transitions to
democracy. 60
One of the most important nonviolent means to protect human
rights is to promote and support democracies. Multiple studies have
found that democratic regimes are less likely to engage in repression
than nondemocratic regimes. 61 Elections offer opportunities to remove

56.
57.

Tasioulas, supra note 1, at 1191.
See generally Del Valle & Sikkink, supra note 4.

58.

LAW AND SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA: A NEW MAP 7-10 (Cesar Rodriguez-
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authorities from office, thus raising the costs of repression. 62
Democratic institutions also provide established,
nonviolent
mechanisms to address grievances and reinforce values of deliberation
and peaceful contestation. 63 While most agree that democratic political
institutions generally reduce repressive behavior, it appears that
democratic institutions mainly contribute to decreased repression after
a certain high threshold is reached, and some institutions or
configurations of a democratic regime have greater effects on
repression levels than others. 64
A semi-democracy is not enough to improve human rights. It takes
a full-fledged democracy with high levels of participation, a system
with electoral competition between multiple parties, and constraints
on the use of executive power in order to discourage repression.6 5 In
other words, democracy is not secured by merely holding elections.
Policies need to encourage high levels of citizen participation in
politics, including but not limited to voting in elections. 66 There also
needs to be multiple political parties that compete with one another in
elections. 67 A single-party system is not able to create the genuine
competition necessary for democracy.68 Finally, the necessary rights to
make both participation and competition meaningful need to be in
place.6 9 If the government threatens citizens for simply speaking their
minds, for example-denying them freedom of speech-the conditions
for serious elections are not in place.70
Among many governments, as well as among some scholars and
activists, there continues to be some doubt about whether democracy
is essential for human rights improvements. Some claim that to speak
in favor of democracy is an ideological statement, maybe even a
religious one.7 1 But the many studies of the causes of human rights
violations have made it abundantly clear that democracy is essential
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for human rights to succeed, but not sufficient. 72 Many democracies do
not have robust human rights practices, but there are not any countries
73
with robust human rights practices that are not democracies.
Given that a strong democracy is a necessary but not a sufficient
condition for full human rights protections, there are good reasons for
courts to display some deference to some decisions of majorities in
democracies. In this sense, Moyn calls attention to an important issue
of the tension between the demands of rights and the decisions of
majorities in democracies like the United States. 74 The European
Court of Human Rights has long had a doctrine called the "margin of
appreciation" doctrine that tries exactly to do this. 75 The term
"doctrine of margin of appreciation" does not appear in the European
Convention on Human Rights, but it is well established in the case law
of the European Court. 76 The origins of the doctrine go back to 1958,
the year before the European Court was established, in a decision of
the European Commission about Article 15, in determining the
existence of a public danger that might justify derogation from
obligations.7 7 But the court also determined that states "do not enjoy
unlimited power in this respect."7 8 Later cases looked at freedom of
expression explicitly within the confines of a democratic society. 7 In
applying the doctrine, the court imposes self-restraint on its power of
review, accepting that domestic authorities should have a certain
autonomy in applying the convention.8 0
While the court may be giving the margin to domestic courts, not
to democratic forces per se, it is quite suggestive that this doctrine
emerged in the European Court exactly at a time when all of its
members were democratic. A similar doctrine, for example, has not
been used in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR),
which emerged in a context of many authoritarian countries. si
Essentially, the margin of appreciation might be seen as the deference
that a regional court can give to its democratic state members, but that
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it might choose not to give to more authoritarian states. 8 2 Now that the
European Court is dealing with more authoritarian members 8 3 and the
IACtHR is having to deal with more democratic ones, 84 the IACtHR
needs a margin of appreciation doctrine, and the European Court
might consider how to be more cautious in its use of its doctrine.
Although democracy is necessary, it is not a sufficient condition
for rights protections. Majorities historically have been quite willing to
violate the rights of minorities, and without some countervailing
processes, rights violations have been and can be quite serious, even in
democracies. 85 This is exactly the reason why strong democracies are
liberal or constitutional democracies, with rights enshrined in their
constitutions.8 6 Flagrant disregard for the rights of minorities can be
addressed from within such democracies in multiple ways, such as by
social movements, political parties, and by courts-and these are not
mutually exclusive at all, as Moyn seems to suggest. 87 A careful
analysis of movements for the rights of racial minorities as well as for
women's rights in the United States would find that it was exactly the
combination of social movement, litigation, and institutionalization,
that was essential.8 8 So, while democracies are entitled to a margin of
appreciation, they should not be given a carte blanche, and it is up to
a judicious judiciary to make that distinction.
Moyn's paper has a bit too much of dichotomous thinking, with
democracy held up against courts and rights, instead of understanding
that all strong democracies are constitutional democracies with rights
protections built into their very structure. 89 Even so, there are of
course important debates to be had about when courts, both domestic
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and international, should defer to majorities. But it is not persuasive,
as Moyn quotes Frankfurter as saying, that when judicial guardians
do not act for human rights, it is an opportunity to "powerfully help to
bring the people and their representatives to a sense of their own
responsibility."9 0 Or at least no good evidence has been shown that this
is the case. Human rights tend to advance when both judicial actors
and social movement actors are working together, not when the judicial
branch refuses to act.
How might these Articles talk to one another? Tasioulas's
discussion of some of the cases of the South African Constitutional
Court might be very relevant for Moyn's thinking about Frankfurter
91
and how courts can defer to democratic institutions. Indeed at one
point Moyn cites Frankfurter saying that he firmly believed that judges
possessed no expertise in balancing rights against rights or other
92
priorities "proportionally" or in some other way. This echoes the
language of the Treatment Action Campaign case, cited by Tasioulas,
when the South African Constitutional Court says "Courts are illsuited to adjudicate upon issues where a court order could have
93
multiple social and economic consequences for the community." Here
is another court thinking hard about ways in which "the judicial,
legislative, and executive functions achieve appropriate constitutional
balance." 94 Likewise Tasioulas makes an interesting contrast between
the South African Constitutional Court and Brazilian and Colombian
95
courts, which take rather different positions, with different results.
Here Tasioulas draws on the research of his colleague, Octavio Ferraz,
whose empirical research on Brazilian right to health cases shows that
such cases might distort health spending in ways that are regressive
in their effects. 96 While the plaintiffs in these cases are not necessarily
the "wrong minorities" discussed by Moyn, their successful claims can
97
have negative effects on equitable overall health spending. In the
very last pages of Tasioulas's Article, there is a dialogue with the Moyn
Article, when Tasioulas argues that courts should not assume the role
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of retrospective lawmakers.9 8 He and Moyn appear to agree that the
legitimacy of law is compromised when not subject to robust democratic
accountability, and that a human rights ethos will be sapped by having
human rights matters systematically decided in court proceedings
rather than as part of ordinary democratic policies.99
If Moyn intends to extend his Article to a more general modern
human rights context, he should consider putting Frankfurter in dialog
with, for example, South African Constitutional Court justices in their
decision to the Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal
case. 100 The South African Constitution provides for the "right to
health," including emergency treatment, and the South African
Constitutional Court has been very attentive to human rights
issues. 0 1 Nevertheless in this case, the justices decided not to order a
hospital to provide kidney dialysis for a single litigant.1 02
Instead the justices deferred to "rational decisions taken in good
faith by political organs."' 0 3
The South African Constitutional Court wrote:
The provincial administration which is responsible for health services in
KwaZulu-Natal has to make decisions about the funding that should be made.
available for health care and how such funds should be spent. These choices
involve difficult decisions to be taken at the political level in fixing the health
budget, and at the functional level in deciding upon the priorities to be met. Al
court will be slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by the
political organs and medical authorities whose responsibility it is to deal with
1 04
such matters.

In other words, there are interesting and important decisions being
made by courts in democracies like South Africa and India trying to
grapple in sophisticated ways with exactly these complicated relations
between democratic politics and human rights. Io0 Moyn should
consider these cases before he sets up another ill-considered dichotomy
of democracy versus human rights.
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III. CONCLUSION
These stimulating Articles remind us of the importance of
restraint-restraint in the creation of new human rights law, and
restraint or deference in judicial activism in both enforcing human
rights law and constitutional law. In the age of rights, such calls for
restraint and deference should be critically welcomed and debated. But
a vision for the future of human rights calls for more than doctrines of
restraint and deference. It calls for a positive agenda for change. In The
Hidden Face of Rights, it is argued that such a positive agenda involves
a greater commitment to implement human rights more effectively by
embracing responsibilities. 0 6 It is not about responsibilities rather
than rights, or about the responsibilities of nonstate actors rather than
those of states. It is about the necessity of creating and articulating
firmer norms and practices of networked responsibilities among
diverse actors as necessary complements to human rights in order to
realize those rights more fully.
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